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SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After 
Sarbanes-Oxley 
By jayne W Barnard* 
Corporate misdeeds will be found and will be punished .... The SEC will 
now have the administrative authority to bar dishonest directors and officers 
from ever again serving in positions of corporate responsibility .... Corporate 
crime will no longer pay. 
President George W Bush 1 
Beginning in the spring of 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
"Commission") set out to acquire the power to suspend or bar individuals from 
serving as an officer or director of a public company. The Commission had long 
enjoyed the administrative power to suspend or bar brokers, investment advisers, 
and investment company managers. 2 Since 1990, it had also had the power to 
seek a court order suspending or barring securities law violators from serving as 
a public company officer or director. 3 
In the Commission's view, several changes in the existing regime seemed nec-
essary. First, the Commission wanted to modify the standard applied by federal 
courts when considering requests for suspension or bar orders. Second, and per-
haps more importantly, it wanted to eliminate the need to go to court in order to 
secure a suspension or bar order against securities law violators. 
With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the "Act" or "Sarbanes-Oxley") in 
july 2002,4 the Commission has apparently seen its dreams (on this issue) come 
true. First, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act now provides that, in order for a federal district 
court to enter a suspension or bar order, it need only find that the defendant 
before it is "unfit."5 This standard is a change from the prior formulation, which 
*james Goold Cutler Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary. Thanks to Ted Cundick, 
William and Mary Class of 2004, for his outstanding research assistance on this and other projects. 
Thanks also to Mechele Dickerson, Lisa Nicholson, Doug Branson, Neal Devins, and john Tucker for 
their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
l. Press Release, Remarks by the President at Signing of H.R. 3763, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730-l.html (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2003). 
2. See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
5. /d. § 305, 116 Stat. at 778. 
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required a finding of "substantial unfitness."6 Despite its ambiguity, the change in 
language was clearly intended to reduce the burden of proof required of the 
Commission. 7 
The Act also provides that the SEC may now enter a suspension or bar order 
on its own in a cease-and-desist proceeding, rather than having to go to court. 
The applicable standard is the same as the standard now employed by the federal 
courts-"unfitness. "8 
The impact of these two new provisions is obvious. First, the Commission will 
no longer have to go to federal court in order to secure a suspension or bar order. 
Instead, it will seek most of these orders in the less demanding context of cease-
and-desist proceedings.9 Second, the Commission is likely to argue that the task 
of proving "unfitness" is significantly less demanding than the task of proving 
"substantial unfitness." Third, by utilizing the cease-and-desist proceeding rather 
than going to court to seek a suspension or bar order, the Commission will argue 
that it is no longer required to show a "reasonable likelihood" of future misconduct 
(as has been required by the courts to support such an order), but need only to 
demonstrate "some risk" of future misconduct. This standard, or at least some 
version of it, is the standard the Commission now employs (and the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has endorsed) in cease-and-desist proceedings. 10 
In this Article, I will briefly review the history of the Commission's suspension 
and bar powers prior to enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 11 I will then briefly 
examine both the character of cease-and-desist proceedings prior to Sarbanes-
Oxley, and the law that governs those proceedings, especially recent case law 
defining the standard for entering a cease-and-desist order.12 I will then trace the 
evolution of those portions of Sarbanes-Oxley which changed the standard for 
entry of a suspension or bar order from "substantial unfitness" to "unfitness," and 
discuss what this change might mean in practice. 13 Finally, I will explore the 
strengths and weaknesses of the new statutory regime. 14 
6. See 15 U.S. C.§ 77t(e) (2000) (Securities Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2000) (Exchange Act). 
7. See infra the section entitled "Gaps in the Sarbanes-Oxley Legislative History." 
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act§ 1105, 116 Stat. at 809-10. 
9. This is especially true if the Commission succeeds in getting statutory authority to obtain civil 
money penalties from officers and directors in cease-and-desist proceedings. See H.R. 2179, theSe-
curities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003, which would provide the necessary 
authority. The Security Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003, H.R. 2179, 108th 
Cong. (2003). The Commission is vigorously supponing this bill. See Testimony Concerning the 
Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act, Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of 
Enforcement, SEC (June 5, 2003) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/060503tssmc.htm. 
10. See infra the section entitled "The Evolution of the 'Some Risk' Standard in Cease-and-Desist 
Proceedings." 
11. See infra the section entitled "A Brief History of the SEC's Suspension and Bar Powers." For a 
fuller treatment of this history, see jayne W Barnard, The SEC's Suspension and Bar Powers in Perspective, 
76 TULANE L. REv. 1253 (2002); jayne W Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 
1989: Disenfranchising Shareholders in Order to Protect Them, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 32 (1989); jayne 
W Barnard, When is a Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit to Serve"?, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1489 (1992). 
12. See infra the section entitled 'The Rise and Use of Cease-and-Desist Proceedings." 
13. See infra the sections entitled "The Origins and Unfolding of the Sarbanes-Oxley Suspension 
and Bar Provisions" and "Gaps in the Sarbanes-Oxley Legislative History." 
14. See infra the section entitled "The Strengths and Weaknesses of the New Regime." 
HeinOnline -- 59 Bus. Law. 393 2003-2004
SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After Sarbanes-Oxley 393 
The most obvious strengths of the new legislation are (i) its efficiency; (ii) its 
symbolic value (in enacting Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress has endorsed the Com-
mission's view that it should have new and powerful tools to hold executives 
accountable when they fail in their fiduciary duties) ; and (iii) the fact that the 
Commission is now in parity with other federal agencies, specifically federal bank-
ing regulators, in its ability to administratively suspend and bar individuals who 
flagrantly violate its rules. 
There are several problems with the new legislation, however, which are com-
pounded by the meager legislative history that accompanies the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. These problems include: (i) neither the statute nor its legislative history pro-
vides any useful parameters by which courts or the Commission may evaluate the 
critical issue of "unfitness"; (ii) both the statute and its legislative history fail to 
distinguish between conduct that may warrant a finite-term suspension from serv-
ing as a public company officer or director and the more egregious types of 
conduct that may warrant a lifetime bar; (iii) both the statute and its legislative 
history fail to resolve the issue of most concern to the Commission-whether and 
in what ways the Commission will have to demonstrate a likelihood of recurring 
misconduct before a court will enter a suspension or bar order or before entering 
its own suspension or bar order in a cease-and-desist proceeding; and (iv) the 
statute fails to provide for a "safety valve" by which debarred persons, after a 
reasonable period of time, might have a meaningful chance to resume the right 
to seek executive-level work commensurate with their skills. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SEC's SUSPENSION AND BAR POWERS 
THE INJUNCTIONS-ONLy ERA 
From 1934, when the SEC was created, until 1990, when the Securities En-
forcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act (the "Remedies Act")15 was 
passed, the primary tool available to the SEC Enforcement Division was the in-
junction.16 The injunction is, in fact, many different tools, because it encompasses 
such orders as disgorgement of profits, 17 orders to discontinue specific violations 
of the law,18 orders imposing a receivership on misbehaving corporations,19 and 
15. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 
104 Stat. 931 (1990). 
16. See Daniel]. Morrissey, SEC Injunctions , 68 TENN. L. REV. 427 (2001). 
17. See, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 833 E2d 1086, 1096 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988); 
SEC v. Blatt, 583 E2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978); see also SEC v. Blavin, 760 E2d 706, 713 (6th Cir. 
1984); SEC v. Materia, 745 E2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); SEC v. 
Commonwealth Chern. Sec., Inc., 574 E2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978). 
18. See Barnard , The SEC's Suspension and Bar Powers in Perspective, supra note 11 , at 1257 
nn.17-18 . 
19. See, e.g., SEC v. KS Res., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5891 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 1997) (affirming district 
court's appointment of a permanent receiver); SEC v. Am. Bd . of Trade, Inc. 830 E2d 431 , 438 (2d 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 938 (1988); SEC v. First Fin. Group of Tex., 645 E2d 429, 436-37 
(5th Cir. 1981); SEC v. Elmas Trading Corp. , 625 F. Supp. 890 (D. Nev. 1986); SEC v. R. J. Allen & 
Assocs., 386 E Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974); see also SEC v. Health Main. Centers, Inc, Litigation Release 
No. 17664, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2043 (WD. Wash. Aug. 7, 2002). 
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other ancillary orders such as those requiring the appointment of a compliance 
officer or new board-level committee. 20 The most encompassing type of injunction 
is the "obey-the-law" injunction, which prohibits the defendant from violating any 
provision of the federal securities laws. 21 
Prior to enactment of the Remedies Act, the Commission believed that its power 
to seek an injunction also included the power to seek an order suspending or 
barring a defendant from serving as an officer or director of the company within 
which the securities violation had occurred; in effect, this was a court-ordered 
removal from office. 22 The Commission also believed that the power to seek an 
injunction included the power to seek an order suspending or barring a defendant 
from serving as an officer or director of any public company. Certainly, the Com-
mission often included such a request in its complaints. It appears, however, that, 
prior to passage of the Remedies Act in 1990, only one such order was ever 
actually entered by a federal district court.23 Nevertheless, these types of orders 
were routinely included in dozens of pre-Remedies Act settlements.24 Ultimately, 
in a case involving the colorful Victor Posner, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit confirmed that the Commission did, in fact, have the authority to 
seek a suspension and bar order as an ancillary remedy, even in the absence of 
express statutory authority. 25 
THE REMEDIES ACT PROVIDES EXPRESS AUTHORITY TO SEEK 
SUSPENSION AND BAR ORDERS IN COURT 
Beginning in 1987, under the direction of Chairman David S. Ruder, and con-
tinuing into the George H. W Bush administration, under the direction of Chair-
man Richard C. Breeden, the Commission pursued four key legislat~ve initiatives: 
20. See, e.g., SEC v. Xerox Corp., Litigation Release No. 17465, 2002 SEC LEXIS 896, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. ll, 2002) (requiring the issuer to appoint a committee of outside directors to review 
the company's internal accounting controls and policies); SEC v. Cannon Group, Inc., Litigation Re-
lease No. ll603, 39 S.E.C. Docket 330 (Nov. 9, 1987) (requiring the issuer to hire a consultant to 
review new policies and procedures for a three-year period); SEC v. Mattei, Inc., Litigation Release 
No. 6531,5 S.E.C. Docket 240,1974 SEC LEXIS 2566, at *1 (Oct. 2, 1974) (requiring the issuer to 
appoint two additional unaffiliated directors and to establish a Financial Controls and Audit Committee 
and a Litigation and Claims Committee). 
21. See Barnard, The SEC's Suspension and Bar Powers in Perspective, supra note ll, at 1257 n.19 
and accompanying text. 
22. See, e.g., SEC v. Am. Beef Packers, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
~ 96,079, at 91,877 (D. Neb. May 4, 1977) (enjoining the defendant from assuming any position as 
officer or director of American Beef Packers, Inc., except upon a showing that procedures have been 
instituted to prevent a recurrence of violations of the securities laws). 
23. See SEC v. Techni-Culture, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)~ 94,501, 
at 95,759 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1974) (ordering that defendant White is "hereby prohibited from as-
suming a position as or continuing to act as either an officer or director of any public company 
except upon a showing to the Court that measures have been taken to prevent repetition of the 
conduct alleged .... "). 
24. See jayne W Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989, supra note ll, at 
54-55 n.158 (listing settled cases); Jayne W Barnard, When is a Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit 
to Serve"?, supra note ll, at 1509 n.101 (same). 
25. SEC v. Posner, 16 F3d 520, 521-22 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming the entry of a lifetime bar order), 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1077 (1995). 
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(i) a proposal by which the Commission would receive express authority to seek 
civil penalties in litigated proceedings; (ii) a proposal by which the Commission 
would receive authority to conduct its own administrative proceedings, known 
as cease-and-desist proceedings, against unregulated securities laws violators as 
well as regulated professionals; (iii) a proposal to expressly authorize federal dis-
trict courts to enter suspension and bar orders in litigated proceedings; and 
(iv) a proposal by which the Commission would, itself, be authorized to enter 
suspension or bar orders in cease-and-desist proceedings. 
The first proposal, civil penalties, bore fruit when the Remedies Act was passed 
in 1990.26 The Remedies Act authorized the Commission to seek, and district 
courts to impose, monetary penalties for violations of the Securities Act, the Ex-
change Act, the Investment Company Act, and the Investment Advisers Act. 27 The 
second proposal, cease-and-desist powers, also bore fruit through the Remedies 
Act. The Act provided that the Commission may order a person who "is violating, 
has violated, or is about to violate any provision of [the federal securities laws]," 
to cease-and-desist from committing the violation. 28 The Commission may also 
enter a cease-and-desist order against any person that "is, was, or would be a 
cause of [a securities law] violation."29 The third proposal, express suspension and 
bar authority for the federal district courts, also was successful, though not in the 
way the Commission had initially hoped.30 The Remedies Act expressly authorized 
the district courts to enter a suspension or bar order only in cases involving 
scienter-based violations. 31 The standard for determining whether a suspension 
or bar order was appropriate was whether the defendant's conduct reflected "sub-
stantial unfitness to serve."32 
Only the fourth proposal failed. Congress denied the Commission the authority 
to enter suspension or bar orders administratively as part of its cease-and-desist 
powers. Critics had warned that granting such authority would confer on the 
26. See Ralph C. Ferrara eta!., Hardball! The SEC's New Arsenal of Enforcement Weapons, 47 Bus. 
LAw. 33 (1991) (detailing the legislative history of the Remedies Act). 
27. See Securities Act § 20(d), 15 U.S. C. § 77t(d) (2000); Exchange Act § 2l(d)(3), 15 U.S. C. 
§ 78u(d)(3)(2000); Investment Company Act§ 42(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(e) (2000); Investment Ad-
visers Act§ 209(e), 15 U.S. C. § 80b-9(e) (2000). 
28. See Securities Act§ 8A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(a); Exchange Act§ 21C(a), 15 U.S. C.§ 78u-3(a); 
Investment Company Act§ 9([)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(f)(1); Investment Advisers Act§ 203(k)(l), 15 
u.s. c. § 80b-3(k)(l). 
29. See Securities Act§ 8A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(a); Exchange Act§ 21C(a), 15 U.S. C.§ 78u-3(a); 
Investment Company Act§ 9(£)(1), 15 U.S. C. § 80a-9(f)(1); Investment Advisers Act§ 203(k)(l), 15 
U.S. C. § 80b-3(k)(1). The Commission is also authorized to order the -respondent to comply, or to 
take steps to effect compliance, with the relevant securities statute upon such terms and conditions 
and within such time as the Commission may specify. 
30. For example, the Commission's initial proposal would have permitted the entry of a suspension 
or bar order for any securities law violation, including negligent violations, and provided no standard 
by which a determination could be made. See Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 
1989, supra note 11, at 33. 
31. See Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on SEC Settlements, 
47 Bus. LAw. 1083, 1104 (1992) (noting that "Congress intended corporate bars for use against 
'deliberate fraudulent conduct,' and suggested that the remedy may be appropriate [only] against 
recidivists or in cases where the violation was 'particularly egregious'"). 
32. Securities Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 77t(e); Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2). 
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Commission "unwarranted power and would distort its proper role in maintaining 
the integrity of the capital markets. "33 
THE COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE "SUBSTANTIAL 
UNFITNESS" STANDARD 
Following enactment of the Remedies Act, federal district courts soon began 
construing "substantial unfitness" by reference to the so-called "six-factor" test, 
which called for consideration of the following six factors: "(l) the 'egregiousness' 
of the underlying securities law violation; (2) the defendant's 'repeat offender' 
status; (3) the defendant's 'role' or position when he engaged in the fraud; (4) the 
defendant's degree of scienter; (5) the defendant's economic stake in the violation; 
and (6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur."34 The six-factor test was later 
refined by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Pate/.35 The Patel court recognized the six-
factor test as "useful in making the unfitness assessment,"36 but went on to caution: 
[W]e do not mean to say that [the six factors] are the only factors that may 
be taken into account or even that it is necessary to apply all these factors 
in every case. A district court should be afforded substantial discretion in 
deciding whether to impose a bar to employment in a public company.37 
Relying on the six-factor test or some variant of it, courts from 1990 until 2002 
issued only two published opinions denying outright the Commission's requests 
for a suspension or bar order. 38 With these two exceptions, however, the Com-
mission was consistently successful throughout the 1990s whenever it sought a 
suspension or bar order. In two cases, the court declined to enter a lifetime bar 
order, but instead entered six-year and ten-year suspension orders, respectively, 
applicable across all industries.39 In another case, the court declined to enter an 
order applicable across all industries, but rather entered a lifetime bar order pre-
cluding the defendant from serving as an officer or director of any banking or 
financial institution.40 In still another case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
33. Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989, supra note 11, at 34. 
34. SEC v. Shah, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.~ 98,374, at 90,592 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993). 
35. 61 E3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995). 
36. Id. at 141. 
37. Id. 
38. See SEC v. Pace, 173 E Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that the defendant could be 
enjoined from engaging in the type of conduct proven in this case but that the Commission had failed 
to establish that he should be barred); SEC v. Shah, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
~ 98,374, at 90,592 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that where the defendant, a first offender, had already 
been disciplined in parallel proceedings and permanently barred from doing business with the FDA, 
the Commission had not demonstrated a need for either a permanent bar or suspension order). 
39. SEC v. McCaskey, [2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.~ 91,533, at 97,404 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) 
(entering a six-year suspension order); SEC v. Murphy, litigation Release No. 17538, 2002 SEC LEXIS 
1388 (May 30, 2002) (reponing that the U.S. District Coun for the District of Massachusetts had 
entered a ten-year suspension order). 
40. SEC v. Farrell, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.~ 99,365, at 96,305 (WD.N.Y. 
1996). 
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Second Circuit cautioned against knee-jerk resort to a lifetime bar order when a 
finite suspension or an industry-specific order might protect the interests of in-
vestors just as wellY In essence, the court in SEC v. Patel created a hierarchy of 
options, in which lesser sanctions were to be considered and rejected before a 
court could enter the more draconian sanction of a lifetime bar. 
[B]efore imposing a permanent bar, the court should consider whether a 
conditional bar (e.g., a bar limited to a particular industry) and/or a bar 
limited in time (e.g., a bar of five years) might be sufficient, especially where 
there is no prior history of unfitness ... . If the district court decides that a 
conditional ban or a ban limited in time is not warranted, it should give 
reasons why a lifetime injunction is imposedY 
The case was remanded and later settled when the defendant voluntarily accepted 
the imposition of a lifetime bar.43 
With the exception of these few cases, however, and the rare case in which the 
Commission withdrew its request for a suspension or bar order,44 the Commission 
regularly succeeded under the Remedies Act in persuading the courts to enter a 
lifetime bar order.45 It was also successful in securing lifetime bar orders in scores 
of settled cases.46 
41. SEC v. Patel, 61 E3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1995). 
42. /d . 
43. E-mail from Michael J. Resko (Patel's defense counsel) to jayne W Barnard, Professor of Law, 
The College of William and Mary (April 4, 2002) (on file with The Business Lawyer). 
44. See, e.g., SEC v. Antar, 15 E Supp. 2d 477, 533 n.33 (D.N.J. 1998) (noting that the Commission 
had apparently decided not to press the suspension or bar issue). 
45. See, e.g , SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 E3d 1186, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming the 
entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Zubkis, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.~ 90,769, 
at 93, 745 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2000) (entering a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Chester Holdings Ltd., 41 
E Supp. 2d 505, 531 (D.N.j. 1999) (entering a lifetime bar order against defendant joseph Pignatiello); 
SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 E Supp. 846, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (entering a lifetime bar order), aff'd, 
159 E3d 1348 (2d Cir. 1998); see also SEC v. Tanner, Litigation Release No. 17790, 2002 SEC LEXIS 
2631, at *2 (Oct. 17, 2002) (reporting that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York had entered a lifetime bar order against defendants Tanner and Evans); SEC v. johnson, Litigation 
Release No. 17717, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2314, at *3 (Sept. 10, 2002) (noting that, in 1996, the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas had entered a lifetime bar order against defendant 
johnson); SEC v. Scorpion Techs., Inc., Litigation Release No. 17634, 2002 SEC LEXIS 1914, at *1 
(July 29, 2002) (reporting that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York had 
entered a lifetime bar order against defendant Brown); SEC v. Hollywood Trenz, Inc., Litigation Release 
No. 17539, 2002 SEC LEX1S 1421, at *2 (May 30, 2002) (reporting that the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia had entered a lifetime bar order against defendant Showalter); SEC v. Leung, 
Litigation Release No. 17458, 2002 SEC LEXIS 840, at *1 (Apr. 4, 2002) (reporting that the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia had entered a lifetime bar order against defendants Miko 
and Leung); In re Silver, Litigation Release No.15437, 1997 SEC LEXIS 1630, at *3 (Aug. 11, 1997) 
(reporting that the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California had entered a lifetime bar 
order against defendant Silver); SEC v. Monus, Litigation Release No. 14 716, 1995 SEC LEXIS 3095, 
at *1 (Nov. 9, 1995) (reporting that the U.S. District Court for the District of Ohio had entered a 
lifetime bar order against defendant Monus). 
46. See, e.g., SEC v. Matus, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14225, at *7 (E. D. Tex. june 21, 2002) (entering 
by consent a permanent injunction, including a provision barring the defendant from acting as a 
director or officer of any public company); see also SEC v. Eagle Bldg. Techs., Inc., Litigation Release 
No. 17803, 2002 WL 31386094, at *1 (Oct. 23, 2002) (reporting that defendant Damato had con-
sented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Christensen, Litigation Release No. 17787, 78 
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It is thus curious that in February 2002, Stephen M. Cutler, Director of the 
Division of Enforcement, complained that the federal courts were imposing an 
S.E.C. Docket 2261 (Oct. 16, 2002) (reponing that defendant Uselton had consented to the entry of 
a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Kopper, Litigation Release No. 17692, 78 S.E.C. Docket 1090 (Aug. 21, 
2002) (reporting that defendant Kopper had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. 
Tishman, Litigation Release No.17617, 2002 Wl 1558815, at *1 (july 16, 2002) (reponing that 
defendant Tishman had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Mortell, Litigation 
Release No.17542, 77 S.E.C. Docket 2679 (june 5, 2002) (reponing that defendant Monell had 
consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Paloma, Litigation Release No.17462, 2002 WL 
519395, at *1 (Apr. 8, 2002) (reporting that defendants Paloma and Bardasian had consented to the 
entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Nichols, Litigation Release No. 17456, 2002 WL 519399, at *1 
(Apr. 3, 2002) (reporting that defendants Hughes and Whittelsey had consented to the entry of lifetime 
bar orders); SEC v. Barber, Litigation Release No. 17314, 2002 WL 54148, at *1 (jan. 15, 2002) 
(reporting that defendant Barber had consented to a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Caserta, Litigation 
Release No. 17115, 75 S.E.C. Docket 2221 (Sept. 5, 2001) (reponing that defendant Caserta had 
consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. ltex Corp., Litigation Release No. 16841, 73 
S.E.C. Docket 4214 (Dec. 26, 2000) (reporting that defendant Baer had consented to the entry of a 
lifetime bar order); SEC v. Itex Corp., Litigation Release No. 16708, 2000 Wll341720, at * 1 (Sept. 
18, 2000) (reporting that defendant Neal had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. 
Mitchellette, Litigation Release No. 16553, 2000 WL 621125, at *1 (May 15, 2000) (reporting that 
defendant Mitchellette had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Buchanan, Litigation 
Release No. 16518, 72 S.E.C. Docket 748 (Apr. 18, 2000) (reporting the entry of a default judgment 
resulting in a lifetime bar order against defendant Buchanan); SEC v. Strauss, Litigation Release No. 
16360, 71 S.E.C. Docket 262 (Nov. 17, 1999) (reporting that defendant Strauss had consented to the 
entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. United Fire Tech., Inc., Litigation Release No. 16271, 70 S.E.C. 
Docket 1611 (Sept. 2, 1999) (reporting that defendant Kamerling had consented to the entry of a 
lifetime bar order); SEC v. Drabinsky, Litigation Release No. 16022, 68 S.E.C. Docket 3278 (jan. 13, 
1999) (reporting that defendant Eckstein had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. 
DiMauro, Litigation Release No. 15874, 67 S.E.C. Docket 3070 (Sept. 9, 1998) (reporting that defen-
dant DiMauro had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Safronchik, Litigation Release 
No. 15833, 67 S.E.C. Docket 2253 (Aug. 5, 1998) (reporting that defendant Safronchik had consented 
to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Peltz, Litigation Release No. 15657, 1998 WL89096, at 
*1 (Mar. 3, 1998) (reporting that defendant Peltz had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); 
SEC v. Kilgore, Litigation Release No. 15345, 64 S.E.C. Docket 1182 (Apr. 23, 1997) (reporting that 
defendant Kilgore had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Nelsen, Litigation Release 
No. 15343, 64 S.E.C. Docket 1180 (Apr. 22, 1997) (reporting that defendant Nelsen had consented 
to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Pace, Litigation Release No. 15240, 63 S.E.C. Docket 2386 
(Feb. 3, 1997) (reporting that defendant Pace had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC 
v. Env't Cherns. Group, Inc., Litigation Release No. 15183, 63 S.E.C. Docket 1228 (Dec. 11, 1996) 
(reporting that defendant Shenkir had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Kendall 
Square Research Corp., Litigation Release No. 15155, 1996 SEC LEXIS 3143, at *1 (Nov. 12, 1996) 
(reporting that defendant jones had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Axiom Sec. 
Solutions, Inc., Litigation Release No. 15114, 62 S.E.C. Docket 3112 (Oct. 9, 1996) (reporting that 
defendant Parshall had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Sarivoia, Litigation 
Release No. 15110, 62 S.E.C. Docket 3109 (Oct. 4, 1996) (reporting that defendants Anthony Sarivola 
and Donna Sarivola had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Bradstreet, Litigation 
Release No. 15069, 62 S.E.C. Docket 2758 (Sept. 25, 1996) (reporting that three defendants had 
consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Trans-American Ostrich Traders, Inc., Litigation 
Release No. 15037, 62 S.E.C. Docket 2404 (Sept. 11, 1996) (reporting that defendant Earp had 
consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Mclaughlin, Litigation Release No. 14951, 62 
S.E.C. Docket 0486 (june 19, 1996) (reporting that defendant Mclaughlin had consented to the entry 
of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Sani-Tech Indus., Inc., Litigation Release No. 14943,62 S.E.C. Docket 
0379 (june 11, 1996) (reporting that defendant Wasserman had consented to the entry of a lifetime 
bar order); SEC v. Zuloff, Litigation Release No. 14558, 59 S.E.C. Docket 2430 (july 12, 1995) 
(reporting that defendants Benjamin and Zuloff had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); 
SEC v. Towers Fin. Corp., Litigation Release No. 14317, 57 S.E.C. Docket 2941 (Nov. 2, 1994) 
(reponing that defendant Hoffenberg had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. 
Dunlop, Litigation Release No. 14214, 57 S.E.C. Docket 1448 (Aug. 31, 1994) (reponing that defen-
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"unreasonably high" standard of proof in suspension and bar casesY He also 
claimed that "when it comes to 0 and D bars, the courts have simply lost their 
way."4B 
THE COURTS' INSISTENCE THAT THE COMMISSION 
DEMONSTRATE A "REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF fUTURE 
MISCONDUCT" 
At the center of the Commission's concern about the federal courts' approach 
to suspension or bar orders was the fact that, before entering such an order, the 
courts were insisting that the government make an evidentiary showing that the 
defendant posed a "reasonable likelihood of future misconduct."49 This require-
ment is not surprising, given that federal courts require a showing that misconduct 
is reasonably likely to recur prior to entry of any type of injunction.50 Still, the 
Commission seemed confounded by the problem of proving a reasonable likeli-
hood of future misconduct, especially in cases involving first-time offenders. The 
Enforcement Division staff objected to the idea expressed by the Second Circuit 
in Patel51 that first-time offenders should rarely be subject to a lifetime bar order. 52 
They were especially worried that, in catastrophic cases such as Enron, Adelphia, 
or WorldCom, lifetime bar orders might not be available. 
The biggest problem, from the Commission's perspective, was the Second Cir-
cuit's insistence that concrete evidence of a threat of future misconduct is "always 
an important element in deciding whether [to order) a lifetime ban."53 "Although 
it is not essential for a lifetime ban that there be past violations," the court said, 
dant Dunlop had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order) ; SEC v. Delta Rental Sys., lnc., Litigation 
Release No. 13073, 50 S.E.C. Docket 0144 (Oct. 29, 1991) (reponing that defendant Carvajal had 
consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order). This is an incomplete list of the cases in which 
defendants voluntarily accepted a lifetime bar order. 
4 7. Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks at the Glasser LegalWorks 20th Annual Federal Securities Institute 
(Feb. 15, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch538.htm. 
48. ld. 
49. See, e.g., SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 527-30 (D.N.]. 1999) (entering a 
lifetime bar order against one defendant where the "likelihood of future misconduct [was] high" but 
declining to do so against another defendant where the "likelihood of future violations [was] not as 
clear"). 
50. See, e.g., SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that if a defendant has 
violated the federal securities laws, the SEC is entitled to a permanent injunction "if the court deter-
mines there is a reasonable likelihood that [the defendant[ will violate the laws again in the future"); 
SEC v. Youmans, 729 F.2d 413, 415 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that the applicable test is "whether the 
SEC [could show] a reasonable and substantial likelihood that [the defendant}. if not enjoined, would 
violate the securities laws in the future"), cert. denied sub nom. Holliday v. SEC, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984); 
SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 912 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that to obtain an injunction, the SEC 
must show that "there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant[s]. if not enjoined, will again 
engage in the illegal conduct"); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, 1nc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 
1972) (noting that the "critical question" in determining whether to issue an injunction is "whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated"). See generally United States v. WT. 
Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). 
51. 61 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1995). See infra notes 53-54, 132-33 and accompanying text . 
52. See also SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 530 (D.N.]. 1999) (declining to 
enter a lifetime bar order, but instead entering a five-year suspension order against defendant Con-
stance Pignatiello, because, unlike her husband (who was barred), she was not "a repeat offender"). 
53. Patel , 61 F.3d at 141. 
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"we think that it is essential, in the absence of such violations, that a district court 
articulate the factual basis for a finding of the likelihood of recurrence."54 This 
problem was not new to the Commission. Similar concerns had surfaced in in-
junction cases where courts held that the Commission had failed to provide suf-
ficient evidence to satisfy the "reasonable likelihood of future misconduct" test, 
especially in cases involving a single violation. 
In SEC v. Ingoldsby,55 for example, the court found that the defendant's insider 
trading was an "isolated event"56 and his post-trial assurances that he would not 
again violate Rule lOb-S were sufficiently credible to obviate the need for an 
injunction. 57 In SEC v. Scott,58 the court found that, even though one of the de-
fendants , Raymond Dirks, had participated in a public offering with knowledge 
of "grossly misleading" misstatements in the prospectus,59 and even though he 
had a record of past misconduct before the Commission, evidence from counsel 
with whom he had worked on other offerings suggested that he took great pains 
to comply with the federal securities laws. 60 Accordingly, the court held that the 
Commission had failed to establish a "reasonable likelihood that [his] past wrong-
doing [would] recur."61 
Thoughtful courts recognized, however, that past misconduct could be "highly 
suggestive" of the likelihood of future misconduct62 and that even a single viola-
tion or a cluster of related violations, if sufficiently egregious, could support the 
entry of an obey-the-law injunction. 53 The legislative history of the Remedies Act 
54. Id. at 142. 
55. [1990 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) ~ 95,351, at 96,692 (D. Mass. May 15, 1990). 
56. Id. at 96,693. 
57. Id. 
58. 565 F Supp. 1513 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd sub. nom. SEC v. Cayman Islands Reinsurance Corp., 
734 F2d ll8 (2d Cir. I984). 
59. Id. at 1528. 
60. Id. at 1537. 
61. Td. at 1535-37; see also SEC.v. Pros Int'l, Inc., 994 F2d 767, 769 (lOth Cir. 1993) (upholding 
denial of an injunction where there was "no evidence that future violations are likely"); SEC v. Monarch 
Fund, 608 F2d 938, 94 3 (2d Cir. 1979) (reversing the trial court's entry of an injunction where the 
SEC had failed to show "a realistic likelihood of recurrence" of misconduct); SEC v. Yun, 148 F Supp. 
2d 1287, 1294 (M .D. Fla. 2001) (denying the Commission's request for an injunction because future 
violations were unlikely-the defendants' actions were isolated , the conduct was not egregious, and 
participants regretted their involvement), affd in part and vacated in part , 327 F3d 1263 (lith Cir. 
2003); SEC vEnters. Solutions, Inc. , 142 F Supp. 2d 561 , 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to enter an 
injunction against one of the defendants where the Commission failed to demonstrate that he was 
likely to commit further violations); SEC v. Globus Group, Inc., ll7 F Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (S.D. 
Fla. 2000) (refusing to enter injunction where the Commission's action was based on "isolated, as 
opposed to recurrent , violations of the securities laws"); SEC v. Falbo, 14 F Supp. 2d 508, 529 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (declining to enjoin one of the defendants because the Commission had failed to 
demonstrate that it was reasonably likely that he would commit future violations), modified by 1998 
U.S. Dist. LEX!$ 16020 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 8, 1998); SEC v. Big D Oil&: Gas Co., 434 F Supp. 589, 591 
(D. Tex. 1977) (refusing to issue injunction). 
62. See, e.g., SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F2d 1149, ll68 (D.C. Cir. 1978); SEC v. Mgmt. 
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975). 
63. See, e.g., Mgmt. Dynamics Inc., 515 F2d at 807-DB (upholding the entry of an injunction 
against defendant Levy, even though his misconduct involved communications involving a single 
corporate transaction); SEC v. Gaspar, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder[ Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)~ 92 ,004, 
at 90,980 (S.D. N.Y. Apr. 15, 1985) (entering an injunction even though the defendant's unlawful tips 
were all communicated in connection with a single tender offer) . 
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also suggested that a suspension or bar order might be warranted, even in the 
absence of a history of repeated misconduct, if the conduct at issue could be 
characterized as "egregious. "61 Thus, although most of the Remedies Act decisions 
in which suspension or bar orders were entered involved recidivism,6~ at least one 
of the decisions involved a spectacular first-time offense. 66 It is difficult, in short, 
to understand why the Enforcement Division was expressing so much anxiety 
about its authority. 
THE RISE AND USE OF CEASE-AND-DESIST PROCEEDINGS 
Concurrent with the period during which the Commission was seeking sus-
pension and bar orders in litigated proceedings in federal district courts-usually 
successfully-the Commission was also perfecting its use of the cease-and-desist 
proceeding, which, like the judicial suspension and bar authority, was authorized 
by the Remedies Act67 A cease-and-desist order may simply proscribe unlawful 
conduct, or it may "require [the defendant] to comply, or to take steps to effect 
compliance [with the law] upon such terms and conditions and within such time 
as the Commission may specify. "68 
Cease-and-desist proceedings offer the Commission many advantages over a 
litigated civil enforcement action, including: (i) the proceedings typically move 
much more quickly than a litigated proceeding;69 (ii) the evidentiary requirements 
are more relaxed/0 (iii) discovery is less generous/1 and (iv) unlike courts, which 
64. SeeS. REP. No. 101-337, at 21 (1990) ("A permanent bar might be appropriate if the violation 
were particularly egregious or the violator was a recidivist."). 
65. See, e.g, SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F. 3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting the defendant 
was a recidivist); SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 530 (D.N.j. 1999) (noting that 
the case was not defendant joseph Pignatiello's first encounter with the securities laws: "He has been 
restrained, censured , fined, and even imprisoned for prior securities violations and is currently facing 
criminal charges . .. . In light of this, as well as the fact that he has failed to assure this court that he 
will not engage in future violations ... the likelihood of future misconduct is high."); see also SEC v. 
Drexel Burnham lambert Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the SEC had sued 
the defendants for antifraud violations twice before), afj'd sub nom. Posner v. SEC, 16 F.3d 520 (2d 
Cir. 1994). 
66. See, e.g., SEC v. Robinson, (2002 Transfer Binder! Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ~ 91,948, at 90,479 
(S.D.N.Y. july 16, 2002) (recommending a lifetime bar in light of the fact that defendant's violations 
were not only "egregious," but also "flagrant, indeed one might say outrageous"). The Robinson court 
also took into account the defendant's failure to admit wrongdoing in the underlying offense, plus his 
violation of a preliminary injunction during the pendency of the case. ld. 
67. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
68. See Securities Act§ 8A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h-l(a) (2000); Securities Exchange Act§ 21C(a), 15 
U.S. C. § 78u-3(a) (2000); Investment Company Act § 9(f)(l), 15 U.S. C. § 80a-9(f)(l) (2000); In-
vestment Advisers Act § 203(k)(l), 15 U.S. C. § 80b-3(k)(l) (2000). 
69. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360 (2003) (effective july 17, 2003) (amending rules to streamline pro-
cedures and reduce delay; among the new rules are deadlines for completion of administrative pro-
ceedings of either 120, 210, or 300 days). 
70. 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.320-.326 (2003) 
71. john F. X. Peloso & Stuart M. Sarnoff, The Scope of Discovery Available in SEC Administrative 
Proceedings , 224 N.Y. L. j. 3, 3 (Aug. 17, 2000) ("In contrast to actions commenced by the commission 
in federal district court, where the parties enjoy equal access to the full spectrum of discovery devices 
available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery in administrative proceedings is ex-
tremely limited."). 
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are expected to tailor their injunctions so as not to interfere with lawful conduct,72 
the Commission is not required to finely tailor its cease-and-desist orders or to 
seek the least restrictive means of confining the defendant's future activities. 73 
Another advantage to the Commission of cease-and-desist proceedings over liti-
gated proceedings is (v) the strong degree of deference given by reviewing courts 
to Commission-authorized cease-and-desist orders. 74 It is not surprising, then, 
that in the first decade after enactment of the Remedies Act, permanent cease-
and-desist orders became "one of the SEC's most used remedies."75 
THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF CEASE-AND-DESIST 
PROCEEDINGS 
Cease-and-desist proceedings under section 21 C were created as an '"alternative 
remedy' to an injunction [and were designed to be used] against persons who 
commit isolated infractions."76 The premise behind the cease-and-desist proceed-
ing was that not all securities law violations warranted the imposition of an in-
junction and that sometimes an injunction was "arguably too harsh"77 for the 
misconduct alleged. Congress also believed that some mechanism should be 
found by which the Commission could resolve simple cases "without protracted 
negotiation or litigation."78 The defendants for whom the cease-and-desist pro-
ceeding would be appropriate were those who "present[ed] a lesser threat to 
investors [than those whose cases would more appropriately be heard by a U.S. 
district court]. "79 It was understood that the collateral consequences of a cease-
and-desist order would be less burdensome than a comparable court-ordered 
obey-the-law injunction.80 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE "SOME RISK" STANDARD IN CEASE-
AND-DESIST PROCEEDINGS 
As noted above, it has long been established that, for entry of an injunction, 
any injunction, in a federal district court proceeding, the Commission must 
72. See, e.g., Gemveto jewelry Co. v. jeff Cooper, Inc., 800 F.2d 256, 259 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
("[I[njunctive relief should be narrowly tailored to fit the [defendant's] specific legal violations."); 
Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1251 (2d Cir. 1984) 
("Injunctive relief should be narrowly tailored to fit the specific legal violations adjudged."). 
73. KPMG v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109, 122-23 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("If the Commission is to attain the 
objectives Congress envisioned, it cannot be required to confine its road block to the narrow lane the 
transgressor has traveled; it must be allowed effectively to close all roads to the prohibited goal."). 
74. See Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Tash Force on SEC Settlements, 
47 Bus. LAw. 1083, 1123-24 (1992) ("Traditionally, courts have interpreted the Commission's dis-
cretion in cases litigated before SEC ALjs to be quite broad. Provided the Commission articulates its 
rationale for a given sanction, and the court confirms the Commission's findings that violations have 
occurred, courts rarely disturb the sanction imposed as too severe."). 
75. Andrew M. Smith, SEC Cease-and-Desist Orders, 51 ADMIN L. REv. 1197, 1198 (1999). 
76. In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43862, 2001 SEC LEXIS 98, at *108 
(Jan. 19, 2001) (citing 5. REP. No. 101-337, at 18 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-616, at 24 (1990)). 
77. Smith, supra note 75, at 1202 (quoting the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting, or the "Treadway Commission" report). 
78. Id. at 1203 (quoting Chairman Richard C. Breeden, then-chairman of the Commission). 
79. Id. 
80. ld. at 1227-28. 
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demonstrate a "reasonable likelihood of future misconduct."81 In recent years, the 
Commission has taken the position that a lesser showing will suffice for entry of 
a cease-and-desist order. 
As late as 2000, most administrative law judges (Aljs) hearing SEC cease-and-
desist cases assumed that, in order to support a cease-and-desist order, the Com-
mission would have to satisfy the "reasonable likelihood" standard.82 Some com-
mentators, however, drawing on the experiences of other federal agencies, 
suggested that a lesser standard might suffice.83 Soon, the Commission began 
advocating, and some of the Commission's administrative law judges began con-
sidering, alternatives to the "reasonable likelihood" standard.84 
Sooner or later, the Commission would have to resolve the issue on the record,85 
and the opportunity arose in 2001, when the Commission, for the first time, 
embraced and articulated its preferred "some risk" standard for the entry of a 
cease-and-desist order. The case involved an action against KPMG Peat Marwick 
for failure to observe auditor independence requirements. 56 In reversing the Alj's 
refusal to issue a cease-and-desist order, the Commission ruled that the "reason-
able likelihood of future misconduct" standard applicable in litigated proceedings 
to support an injunction was not required in a cease-and-desist proceeding. After 
reviewing the standards imposed on other federal agencies with cease-and-desist 
authority, it concluded that "while Congress intended that cease-and-desist orders 
be forward-looking, like injunctions, it intended that the showing of risk of future 
violations be significantly less than that required for an injunction."87 
The Commission went on to articulate the applicable standard as the "some 
risk" standard: 
Though "some" risk is necessary, it need not be very great to warrant issuing 
a cease-and-desist order. Absent evidence to the contrary, a finding of vio-
lation raises a sufficient risk of future violation. To put it another way, evi-
dence showing that a respondent violated the law once probably also shows 
a risk of repetition that merits our ordering him to cease and desist. Our 
conclusion is suggested, though not compelled, by the statutory language. 
81. See supra the section entitled "The Courts' Insistence that the Commission Demonstrate a 
Reasonable Likelihood of Future Misconduct." 
82 . See In re Flanagan, 2000 WL 98210, at *36 (Jan. 31 , 2000) ("Assuming, without deciding, 
that the Division must show a reasonable likelihood of future violations, that showing has been made 
here as to all three Respondents."). 
83. See Smith, supra note 75, at 1226-27. 
84. See Flanagan , 2000 WL 98210, at *36 (noting the "dispute" among the Commission's ALJs "as 
to whether the Commission may only impose a cease and desist order where the respondent is 
reasonably likely to commit similar securities violations in the future, or whether no additional show-
ing beyond the underlying violation itself is necessary"); see also Smith, supra note 75, at 1198 (noting 
that "[t]he agency. however, has yet to clarify the circumstances under which it will impose a cease-
and-desist order"). 
85. See In re Feeley & Willcox Asset Mgmt. Corp., 2000 WL 628245, at *22 (May 16, 2000) ("The 
Commission has not [yet] resolved the issue of whether a cease and desist order requires a finding 
that there be a likelihood of a future violation.") . 
86. In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43862, 2001 SEC LEXIS 98, at *2 
(Jan. 19, 2001). 
87.ld. at*114. 
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The statute specifies that we may impose a cease-and-desist order on a person 
who "has violated" the securities laws. This contrasts with our authority to 
seek injunctive relief in those instances when a person "is engaged or about 
to engage" in violative conduct.88 
When challenged on this position, the Commission quickly backtracked and 
conceded that the entry of a cease-and-desist order should not be an "automatic" 
consequence of committing a single securities law violation.89 Instead, it promised 
to "continue to consider our traditional factors in determining whether a cease-
and-desist order is an appropriate sanction based on the entire record."90 It de-
scribed its intended process as follows: 
Many of [the traditional] factors are akin to those used by courts in deter-
mining whether injunctions are appropriate, including the seriousness of the 
violation, the isolated or recurrent nature of the violation, the respondent's 
state of mind[,) the sincerity of the respondent's assurances against future 
violations, the respondent's recognition of the wrongful nature of his or her 
conduct, and the respondent's opportunity to commit future violations. In 
addition, we consider whether the violation is recent, the degree of harm to 
investors or the marketplace resulting from the violation, and the remedial 
function to be served by the cease-and-desist order in the context of any 
other sanctions being sought in the same proceedings. This inquiry is a 
flexible one and no one factor is dispositive. This inquiry is undertaken not to 
determine whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" of future violations but to 
guide our discretion.91 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, by a divided court, affirmed 
the Commission's cease-and-desist order in the KPMG case.92 The majority opin-
ion upheld the Commission's use of a negligence, rather than a scienter, standard 
in a section 2l C proceeding93 It also embraced ·the Commission's adoption of a 
"some-risk-of-future-misconduct" standard.94 On the issue of whether a single 
violation could suffice to support a cease-and-desist order under the "some risk" 
standard, however, the majority blinked. Recognizing the issue as "problematic,"95 
the court carefully reviewed the Commission's approach to the "some risk" issue. 
Even though, the court noted, the Commission in its original KPMG opinion had 
stated that a single violation sufficed to show the necessary likelihood of recur-
rence to support a cease-and-desist order, on reconsideration, the Commission 
had cited multiple violations by KPMG.96 The court went on to note: 
88. Id. at *102-*03. 
89. In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44050, 2001 WL 223378, at *7 
(Mar. 8, 2001) (denying rehearing). 
90. Id. 
91. In re KPMG Peat Marwick, 2001 SEC LEX!S 98, at *116 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
92. KPMG v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
93. Id. at 120. 
94. Id. at 124-26. 
95. Id. at 124. 
96. Id. at 125. 
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The Commission's statement on reconsideration suggests that it may no 
longer consider, as it initially made clear, that any one of its findings of a 
violation, standing alone, would suffice under its standard to enter a cease-
and-desist order. At oral argument counsel for the Commission argued that 
the language in the Reconsideration Order is insufficiently precise to suggest 
that the Commission had changed its mind. In truth, the Reconsideration 
Order leaves this unclear. Nevertheless, in light of the Commission's having 
found several serious violations-all but one of which we affirm-we con-
clude that a remand is unnecessary.97 
In other words , on the issue of whether a "some-risk-of-future-misconduct" 
standard or some higher standard should be required for entry of a cease-and-
desist order, the majority deferred to the Commission. On the issue of whether a 
single violation could satisfy the "some risk" standard, the majority equivocated: 
"[W]e conclude that a remand to allow the Commission to clarify whether simply 
one or a combination of two or more of the violations it found suffice to meet its 
standard for finding a risk of future violation to enter a cease-and-desist order is 
unwarranted in light of the Commission's [multiple] findings of violations .... "98 
What this all means is (i) the Commission defined for itself the standard re-
quired to support a cease-and-desist order as merely "some risk" of future mis-
conduct; (ii) the court of appeals acquiesced in this standard, at least under the 
facts in the KPMG case; (iii) the court failed to address the question whether a 
single violation, without more, could ever satisfy the Commission's "some risk" 
standard; (iv) after Sarbanes-Oxley, the Commission will inevitably seek to apply 
its "some risk" standard to requests for suspension or bar orders in cease-and-
desist proceedings, even though suspension and bar orders are qualitatively dif-
ferent than other forms of cease-and-desist orders; 99 and (v) the Commission will 
probably argue that even a single, non-spectacular violation of the securities laws 
may be sufficient to support a suspension or bar order. 
THE ORIGINS AND UNFOLDING OF THE 5ARBANES-0XLEY 
SUSPENSION AND BAR PROVISIONS 
The Enron scandal began to unfold on October 16, 2001, the date on which 
Enron filed its quarterly financial figures and revealed that it was eliminating over 
one billion dollars in shareholders' equity. 100 From that day forward , and through-
out early 2002 , the SEC was constantly exhorted to be more aggressive, to act 
more swiftly, and to take urgent action against corporate wrongdoers . In his March 
7, 2002 public statement on corporate reform initiatives, President George W 
Bush emphasized the need for "sound regulation and remedies where needed, 
97. ld. (citation omitted). 
98. ld. at 126. 
99. See infra the section entitled "Lack of Guidance on the 'Likelihood of Future Misconduct' 
Issue." 
100. John Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Enron jolt: Investments, Assets Generate Big Loss-Part of 
Charge Tied To 2 Partnerships, WALL Sr.].. Oct. 17 , 2001 , at Cl. 
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without inviting a rush of new lawsuits that exploit new problems instead of 
solving them." 101 Among other elements of his ten-point reform plan, Bush in-
dicated his commitment to enhanced suspension and bar powers for the Com-
mission: "CEOs or other officers who clearly abuse their power should lose their 
right to serve in any corporate leadership positions. This proposal, which would 
require legislation, would authorize the SEC to ban individuals from serving 
as officers or directors of publicly-held corporations if they engage in serious 
misconduct. "102 
SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt also stressed the need for stronger enforcement 
tools at the Commission. 103 Stephen Cutler, the Commission's Director of En-
forcement, went on the speaker's circuit, arguing that so long as suspension and 
bar authority rested exclusively with the courts, individuals "engaged in egre-
gious--even criminal-misconduct" would be free to resume or secure positions 
as corporate officers and directors. 104 "The role of officers and directors is far too 
important to allow those with a questionable commitment to the interests of 
shareholders to serve," Cutler argued. 105 
In response to these cries for legislative reform, on April 24, 2002, the House 
of Representatives passed the Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsi-
bility, and Transparency Act of 2002. 106 One of the issues that was hotly debated 
on this bill was whether the judicial standard for suspension or bar orders should 
be changed from "substantial unfitness" to simple "unfitness." The Democrats 
favored a change in the standard, while the Republicans favored the status quo. 
After considerable wrangling, the House Financial Services Committee decided 
that the "substantial unfitness" standard should not be amended but should be 
left intact107 and the House ultimately adopted that position by a vote of 334 to 
90. 108 The House did pass a provision, however, extending authority to the SEC 
to enter suspension and bar orders in a cease-and-desist proceeding, governed by 
the same "substantial unfitness" standard as then applicable in the courts. 109 
101. Press Release, President Outlines Plan to Improve Corporate Responsibility (March 7, 2002), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releasesl2002/03/20020307-3.html. 
102. Specifics on the President's 10-Point Plan, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2002/03/20020307-3.html (last visited jan. 13, 2004). 
103. See Harvey l. Pitt, Public Statement by SEC Chairman: Remarks at the SEC Speaks Conference 
(February 22, 2002) (outlining the need for many improvements in the enforcement system, including 
a statement of the Commission's intention to seek the power to impose officer and director bars in 
cease-and-desist proceedings), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch540.htm. 
104. jackie Spinner, Errant Directors May Face SEC Ban; Agency to Request New Authority, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 16, 2002, at El. 
105. Cutler, supra note 47. 
106. See 148 CONG. REc. H1544 (2002) (discussion of H.R. 3763). 
107. jackie Spinner, Congress to Consider Expanding SEC Power to Ban Errant Executives, WASH. 
PosT, Apr. 16, 2002, at E4; see also H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at 42-43 (2002), available at http:// 
financialservices. house.gov/media!pdf/hr 107 414. pdf. 
108. juliet Eilperin &jackie Spinner, House Passes Accounting Reform Package; Bill May Face Senate 
Test, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2002, at Al. 
109. Id. The Republicans were deeply committed to this position. Until well into july 2002, the 
White House continued to advocate SEC suspension and bar power authority only where the defen-
dants had engaged in "serious misconduct." Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Bush and Democrats Still Deeply Split 
on What Needs to Be Done, N.Y. TIMES, july 10, 2002, at C5. 
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Then, as corporate reform moved from the House to the Senate, two important 
things happened. First, the Democrats took control of the debate, and second, 
the stock market began a sharp downward drop. From June 1 to July 15, 2002, 
for example, the S&:P 500 index, stressed by the disclosure of accounting scandals 
at WorldCom, Xerox, and Quest Communications, dropped from 1,040 to 918. 
On July 23, the S&P index closed at 798. 
These developments led to mounting pressure to strengthen the SEC's hand 
on a number of issues. The upshot of the process was the passage on July 25, 
2002 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by a vote of 423 to 3 in the House 110 and 99 to 
0 in the Senate. 111 Between April24, 2002, when the House had passed its tepid 
version of corporate governance reforms and the end of July 2002, the Republi-
cans had capitulated on almost every issue. 112 
The provisions governing suspension and bar orders, for example, were just as 
the Democrats had prescribed from the beginning. First, section 305 of Sarbanes-
Oxley provides that the standard for the federal courts to use in deciding whether 
to enter a suspension or bar order is now "unfitness" rather than "substantial 
unfitness." 113 Second, section 1105 provides: 
In any cease-and-desist proceeding . .. , the Commission may issue an order 
to prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or for such 
period of time as it shall determine, any person who has violated section 
10(b) or the rules or regulations thereunder, from acting as an officer or 
director of any [public company], if the conduct of that person demonstrates 
unfitness to serve as an officer or director of any such issuer. 114 
GAPS IN THE 5ARBANES-0XLEY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The legislative history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 115 provides little guidance on 
the meaning of the new suspension and bar provisions, and especially on the 
meaning of the new term "unfitness."116 There is no reference, for example, to 
llO. 148 CONG. REc. H5462, H5480 (2002). 
lll. 148 CONG. REC. S7350, S7365 (2002). 
112. See Jules Witcover, Senators Bail Out on Bush, SALT. SuN, July 17, 2002, at 15A (describing 
the "GOP cave-in"). 
113. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 , Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 305, 116 Stat. 778, 779 (2002). 
114. /d.§ ll05, ll6 Stat. at809. 
115. The legislative hisJOry of Sarbanes-Oxley consists of REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL 
SERVICES TO ACCOMPANY, H.R. 3763, THE CORPORATE AND AUDITING ACCOUNTABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY, 
AND TRANSPARENCY AcT OF 2002, H.R. REP. NO. 107-414 (2002); REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS TO ACCOMPANY S. 2673, THE PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING 
REFORM AND INVESTOR PROTECTION Acr OF 2002, S. REP. No. 107-205 (2002); and CONFERENCE 
REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 3763, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-610 (2002). 
116. The House Report refers only to the "substantial unfitness" standard that was included in the 
House Bill but later revised in conference. H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at17, 42-43. The Senate Report 
says only this: "The sanction of barring securities law violators from serving as officers or directors of 
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cases in which executives have been removed from office for cause. 117 There is no 
criticism of existing case law or of specific cases decided under the former "sub-
stantial unfitness" standard. 118 
Ironically, it is not even clear from the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley that 
the change in language from "substantial unfitness" to "unfitness" was intended 
to reduce the quantum of proof required of the government. Thomas Newkirk, 
Associate Director of Enforcement at the SEC, has acknowledged that "a creative 
defense lawyer might argue that it should be more difficult to determine that 
someone is 'unfit' than it is to determine that the person is 'substantially unfit."'119 
In fact, it would not take much creativity to make this argument. Certainly, it is 
easier for a litigant to demonstrate substantial compliance with a statute than to 
demonstrate strict compliance with it. 120 Similarly, it is easier for a litigant to show 
substantial performance of a contract than complete performance.121 
Consequently, it should now be more difficult for the Commission to demon-
strate "unfitness" than it was to demonstrate "substantial unfitness." I am not 
making that argument, however; it is clear from context, if not from Congress, 
that the "unfitness" standard was intended to reduce the Commission's burden, 
not increase it. 
That being said, there are a number of other problems and omissions in the 
suspension and bar provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We will discuss these 
problems below. First, though, let us consider the obvious advantages of the new 
suspension and bar provisions. 
public companies is strengthened by modifying the standard that governs judicial imposition of officer 
and director bars." S. REP. No. 107-205, at 53. The Conference Report is silent with respect to both 
sections 305 and 1105. 
117. These types of cases, and cases in which non-disclosure of certain forms of misconduct have 
been found to be a material omission in a proxy statement, might provide some useful illustrations 
of the sorts of behavior that might render a person "unfit" to serve as a public company officer or 
director. See Barnard, When Is a Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit to Serve"?, supra note 11, at 
1495-99. 
118. Often when Congress tries to "clean up" a statute or improve it in some way, the legislative 
history makes clear just what about the prior statutory language was unsatisfactory, or what specific 
judicial decisions Congress is attempting to overcome. See, e.g. , H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I , at 23-32 , 
45-48 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549 , 561-70, 583-86 (discussing Congressional intent 
to overturn several Supreme Court decisions including Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonia, 490 U.S. 642 
(1989), and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)); S. REP. No. 100-64, at 2 (1988), 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 3-4 (noting that the intent of the legislation was to "overturn the 
Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, and to restore the effec-
tiveness and vitality of the four major civil rights statutes"). See generally, William N. Eskridge, jr., 
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.]. 331 (1991) (summarizing 
Congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions from 1967-1990). 
119. Audit Committees Want judicious Enforcement, CORP. COUNSEL WEEKLY (BNA), Aug. 20, 2002, 
at 250-51. 
120. See, e.g., Metropolitan Ufe Ins. Co. v. johnson, 97 E3d 558, 568 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he 
doctrine of substantial compliance by its very nature contemplates something less than actual 
compliance."). 
121. See , e.g., Patel v. Ambassador Drycleaning & Laundry Co., 86 S.W3d 304, 307 (Tex. App. 
2002) (distinguishing between complete performance and substantial performance of a contract, with 
the latter characterized by a breach of non-material terms) . 
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THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE NEW REGIME 
THE APPEAL OF THE SUSPENSION AND BAR PROVISIONS 
The Commission sees several advantages to the Sarbanes-Oxley formula over 
the Remedies Act formula for suspension and bar orders. Certainly, the new for-
mula is advantageous both because it eliminates the need to go to court in many 
cases, and, even in those cases that the Commission decides to take to court, it 
imposes a lower standard of proof-"unfitness" rather than "substantial unfit-
ness"-than was previously required under the Remedies Act. 
There is also the issue of parity. Banking regulators have long enjoyed unilateral 
suspension and bar authority with respect to banking officials. 122 The Commission 
itself has exercised suspension and bar powers over brokers, investment advisers, 
and investment company executives without having to go to court. 123 Significantly, 
when administratively barring a regulated professional, the Commission has not 
been required to demonstrate that a lifetime bar order is the least restrictive means 
of protecting the public. 124 Lifetime bars are, thus, commonly ordered against 
regulated professionals. 125 Suspension and bar powers over unregulated individ-
uals, and the freedom to decide when a lifetime bar order is appropriate, can be 
seen in this context as just another version of a proven and effective law enforce-
ment tool. 
Most importantly, the addition of suspension and bar powers to the Commis-
sion's arsenal sends a strong symbolic message . At the time he signed Sarbanes-
Oxley, President Bush declared that he intended to "do everything in [his] power 
to end the days of cooking the books, shading the truth, and breaking our laws. "126 
Empowering the SEC to cut off a defendant's primary means of livelihood offers 
122. See 12 U.S. C. § 1818(e)(l) (2000) (permitting debarment of a banking official where she has 
"engaged or participated in any unsafe or unsound [banking] practice" from which "the insured de-
pository institution's depositors have been or could be prejudiced" and which "demonstrates willful 
or continuing disregard by such party for the safety or soundness [of the banking system]"); see also 
id. § 2264(b) (permitting debarment of any director or officer of an institution in the Farm Credit 
System who "has evidenced either his personal dishonesty or a willful or continuing disregard for [the] 
safety and soundness ]of the system]"). 
123. See 15 U.S. C.§ 78o(b)(4)(D) (2000) (brokers); id. § 80b-3(e) (investment advisers); id. § 80a-
9(b) (investment company executives). 
124. Rizek v. SEC, 215 F.3d 157, 161 (1st Cir. 2000). 
125. See, e.g., McNabb v. SEC, 298 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding Commission's 
decision affirming a lifetime bar order imposed by NASD); Otto v. SEC, 253 F. 3d 960 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(same), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1021 (2001); In re Edwards, Exchange Act Release No. 47682 (Apr. 15, 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation!admin134-47682.htm (barring defendants Stock and 
Lynds from any association with a broker or dealer); In re Abresch, Exchange Act Release No. 47655, 
2003 SEC LEX!S 852, at *3 (Apr. 10, 2003) (barring defendant from any association with a broker 
or dealer); In re Villar, Exchange Act Release No. 47625 (April 3, 2003), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/litigation!admin/34-47625.htm (same); In re Ingardia, Exchange Act Release No. 47619,2003 
SEC LEXIS 775, at *5 (Apr. 2, 2003) (same); In re j.W Barclay & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 
47611, 2003 SEC LEXIS 762, at *5 (Apr. 1, 2003) (same); In re Efstathiou, Exchange Act Release 
No. 47601, 2003 SEC LEXIS 757, at *3 (Mar. 31, 2003) (same); In re Bentley, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 47589, 2003 SEC LEXIS 754, at *3 (Mar. 28, 2003) (same); In re Sanders, Exchange Act 
Release No. 47579, 2003 SEC LEXIS 712, at *4 (Mar. 27, 2003) (same). This is an incomplete list. 
126. Kenneth T. Walsh eta!., Bush & the Bear, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., july 22, 2002, at 20. 
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an unquestionably powerful tool with which to secure cooperation, elicit critical 
testimony, draw attention to high-profile wrongdoers, and impose crippling sanc-
tions on defendants who refuse to cooperate with the government. Seen in the 
context of widespread corporate abuses, the Congressional decision to expand 
the Commission's powers in this area is a reasonable response to a pattern of 
misconduct designed to achieve Congressional objectives in a cost-effective, 
streamlined way. 
PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUTE 
Lack of Clarity About What Constitutes "Unfitness" 
When the Remedies Act was passed in 1990, Congress provided little useful 
guidance on the meaning of the term "substantial unfitness." This encouraged 
federal judges to create their own meaning, a process with which the Commission 
later took exception. 127 Now, Congress has passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
once again it has provided no guidance on the meaning of the new term "unfit-
ness." Once again, the courts will devise their own approach to this issue, perhaps 
deviating little from their approach to the earlier "substantial unfitness" standard. 
One hopes the courts will focus on the core of the issue: whether a defendant is, 
in fact, unfit to serve as an officer or director of a public company. This inquiry 
should include consideration of (i) whether the defendant has an understanding 
of the fiduciary role of an officer or director; (ii) whether there is reason to believe 
that she is unable to perform that role professionally and responsibly in a setting 
other than the setting in which her prior misconduct occurred; (iii) whether she 
has expressed contrition for past misconduct and whether that expression is cred-
ible; and (iv) whether carefully-drawn limitations, such as a prohibition against 
participating in the preparation of financial documents or communicating with 
analysts or the public, might serve to ensure that, if the defendant is hired as an 
officer or director, future misconduct will not recur. The primary question at the 
end of the day will be whether the defendant's conduct was so far outside the 
norms of professional conduct-because of its clandestine nature, the magnitude 
of its harm, or the contempt it showed for the interests of investors-that the 
defendant should be regarded as incapable of rehabilitation. 
Regardless of which approach the courts ultimately embrace, the public would 
have benefited greatly had Congress been more specific in its articulation of the 
problem or problems it was trying to remedy. 128 At a minimum, Congress should 
have specified the sorts of issues to be taken into consideration before entering a 
127. See Cutler, supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
128. As an example of the kind of clarity that would have been useful, see 15 U.S.C § 80ac9(b) 
(2000), governing the debarment of investment company executives. Under this provision, an exec-
utive may be debarred only where: 
(l) [he or she] has willfully made or caused to be made in any registration statement, application 
or report filed with the Commission under this subchapter any statement which was at the 
time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with 
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suspension or bar order, either in the text or in the legislative history For example, 
is a tippee who trades on non-public information about a company with which 
she is not affiliated inevitably going to be characterized as "unfit"?129 Should every 
accountant or investment banker caught up in a fraudulent investment scheme 
be treated as "unfit"? Which aspects of a securities law violation should matter to 
the decision maker? The degree of scienter? The nature of the offense? The 
character of the victims? The amount of harm done? In other contexts, Congress 
has attempted to answer these questions. 130 Now, only case law will yield the 
answers. 131 
respect to any material fact, or has omitted to state in any such registration statement, ap-
plication, or report any material fact which was required to be stated therein; 
(2) [he or she! has willfully violated any provision of the Securities Act of 1933 ... or of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . or of subchapter II of this chapter, or of this subchapter, 
or of the Commodity Exchange Act ... or of any rule or regulation under any of such statutes; 
(3) !he or she] has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured the 
violation by any other person of the Securities Act of 1933 ... or of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 ... or of subchapter II of this chapter, or of this subchapter, or of the Commodity 
Exchange Act ... or of any rule or regulation under any of such statutes; 
( 4) !he or she] has been found by a foreign financial regulatory authority to have -
(A) made or caused to be made in any application for registration or report required to be 
filed with a foreign securities authority, or in any proceeding before a foreign securities 
authority with respect to registration, any statement that was at the time and in light of 
the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any 
material fact, or has omitted to state in any application or report to a foreign securities 
authority any material fact that is required to be stated therein; 
(B) violated any foreign statute or regulation regarding transactions in securities or contracts 
of sale of a commodity for future delivery traded on or subject to the rules of a contract 
market or any board of trade; 
(C) aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured the violation by any other 
person of any foreign statute or regulation regarding transactions in securities or con-
tracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery traded on or subject to the rules of a 
contract market or any board of trade; 
(5) !he or she] within 10 years has been convicted by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction 
of a crime , however denominated by the laws of the relevant foreign government, that is 
substantially equivalent to an offense set forth in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this 
section; or 
(6) [he or she] by reason of any misconduct, is temporarily or permanently enjoined by any 
foreign court of competent jurisdiction from acting in any of the capacities, set forth in 
paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this section, or a substantially equivalent foreign capacity, 
or from engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in connection with any such 
activity or in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
129. For a case suggesting the answer to this question should be "no," see SEC v. Sargent, 329 F3d 
34, 42 (lst Cir. 2003) (affirming the denial of an injunction and civil penalties for a tippee, notwith-
standing the SEC's argument that such remedies were appropriate). 
130. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8902a(f) (2000) (requiring a decision on whether to bar a health care 
provider from participating in Medicare programs to "take into account- (1) the nature of any claims 
involved and the circumstances under which they were presented; (2) the degree of culpability, history 
of prior offenses or improper conduct of the provider involved; and (3) such other matters as justice 
may require"). 
131. Former SEC Commissioner Joe Grundfest recently suggested that leaving these kinds of issues 
to the courts to resolve serves political ends. See joseph A. Grundfest, Statutes with Multiple Personality 
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation , 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 628 
(2002). 
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Lack of Focus on Proportionality 
As it did in the Remedies Act, Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has once 
again failed to distinguish between the types of behavior that might give rise to a 
finite-term suspension of eligibility from serving as an officer or director of a 
public company and the types of behavior that should give rise to a lifetime bar 
order. The statutory standard, "unfitness," is the same for each. Although unlike 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, this format provides flexibility for courts in 
determining the appropriate level of sanction, it does suggest a lack of clarity 
about just what exactly Congress had in mind in this area. Certainly, it should 
have been possible to delineate one standard of misconduct for a suspension order 
and a higher standard of misconduct for a lifetime bar. 132 Failure to have done so 
encourages the sort of muddy thinking (and prosecutorial overreaching) that the 
court in SEC v. Patel 133 tried to minimize. 
Lack of Guidance on the "Likelihood of Future 
Misconduct" Issue 
Although it is clear that the primary motivating factor behind the Commission's 
efforts to secure its own suspension and bar powers was the desire to escape from 
the judge-made requirement that it show a "reasonable likelihood" of future mis-
conduct in order to secure a court-ordered suspension or bar, it is not at all clear 
that Congress has delivered the intended result. Certainly, there is no indication 
in the text of the statute or the legislative history that, in litigated proceedings, 
any showing other than the traditional "reasonable likelihood" standard will be 
required. Stated another way, it would have been easy enough for Congress in 
either the text or the legislative history of the Act to set out in plain English the 
conditions for finding "unfitness" in a litigated proceeding and to make clear 
whether the "reasonable likelihood" standard or some lesser standard should now 
apply. Neither the Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself nor the legislative history of the Act, 
however, says anything about what degree of likelihood of future misconduct will 
be required for a federal district court to enter a suspension or bar order. Thus, 
it is possible, even likely, that courts will continue to impose a "reasonable like-
lihood" standard in suspension and bar cases. In the absence of a clear directive 
from Congress to the contrary, there is no reason why they should not do so. 134 
132. For example, Congress might have said that simple "unfitness" could warrant entry of a finite-
term suspension order, while "significant unfitness" or "undeniable unfitness" or some similar for-
mulation would warrant a lifetime bar order. Any choice of words suggesting a hierarchy of harm 
would have been useful. Compare typical homicide statutes, which distinguish those types of killings 
that are eligible for terms of imprisonment from other types of killings that are treated as capital 
crimes. 
133. See supra notes 35-37, 41-42, 51, 53-54 and accompanying text. 
134. Support for this approach may be found in the legislative reenactment doctrine, which pro-
vides that, "when Congress enacts a comprehensive revision in an area of law while leaving untouched 
well-established interpretations of the earlier legislation, Congress legislatively enacts the choices and 
interpretations made." Douglas M. Branson, Prairie Populist? The Business and Securities Law Opinions 
of justice john Paul Stevens, 27 RUTGERS l.j. 605, 620 (1996); see also ROBERT A. l<ATZMANN, COURTS 
AND CONGRESS 48-49 (1997) ("When Congress does not give explicit direction about its legislative 
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There is also no indication, either in the statutory text or in the legislative 
history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as to whether Congress intended the "some 
risk" standard or some higher standard to apply in cease-and-desist proceedings. 
It is likely that the Commission will attempt to apply the "some risk" standard in 
suspension and bar cases, however, at least until a court rules that it cannot do 
so. As it happens , a court might make such a ruling in a suspension or bar case 
if it takes into account the significant difference between a garden variety cease-
and-desist order and the much more burdensome suspension or bar order. 
Most people would agree, for example, that they would rather submit to a 
cease-and-desist order that requires them to abstain from future violations of the 
law (while remaining employed) than submit to a suspension or bar order which 
prohibits them from serving as an officer or director of a public company, even if 
that service involves solely legal conduct. Given the difference in the impact of 
these orders on individuals and their families, it would be entirely reasonable for 
a reviewing court to conclude that the burden in terms of the future risk that 
must be shown, should be higher, perhaps much higher, to support a suspension 
or bar order in a cease-and-desist proceeding than that applicable to other types 
of cease-and-desist orders. 
The argument would go something like this: first, Congress has, in the past, 
recognized the special impact of suspension or bar orders on professionals. In the 
case of bankers, for example, Congress recognized: 
[T)he power to suspend or remove an officer or director of a bank or savings 
and loan association is an extraordinary power, which can do great harm to 
the individual affected and to his institution and to the financial system as a 
whole. It must be strictly limited and carefully guarded. 135 
Thus, in passing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, which authorized 
the FDIC to enter suspension and bar orders, the Senate took care to ensure that 
the banking regulators did not descend to "arbitrary, capricious and overbearing 
tactics" in dealing with banking officials. 136 The Senate committee involved with 
the drafting of the statute insisted on a "narrow and careful delineation of the 
circumstances" under which a banking official could be suspended or barred.137 
"Congress purposefully limited the use of suspension and removal power[s] to 
certain types of circumstances, well aware of the dangers of granting unfettered 
discretion to the FDIC to wield such potentially devastating power." 138 
Second, in authorizing the use of occupational restrictions as a condition of 
probation or supervised release in criminal cases, Congress cautioned that such 
meaning, it not only creates added burdens for the couns, it also increases the risk that the judiciary, 
in a good faith effort to make sense of the problems before it, will interpret statutes in ways that the 
legislature did not intend."). 
135. S. REP. No. 1482 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3532, 3539. 
136. Anonymous v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 866, 870-71 (D.D.C. 1985). 
137. Id. at 871. 
138. Id. at 872. 
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conditions should be imposed only as "reasonably necessary" to protect the pub-
lic.139 According to the report of the Senate judiciary Committee, 
The Committee recognize[d] the hardship that can flow from preventing a 
person from engaging in a specific occupation, business, or profession, 
particularly for those activities requiring many years of education and 
experience. 140 
Courts, too, have noted the heavy burden placed on professionals when they are 
stripped of their right to seek work commensurate with their skills, even tem-
porarily. Courts have spoken of the "serious hardship" imposed when a defendant 
is barred from seeking work nationwide. 141 Courts have also recognized that sus-
pension and bar orders are a "radical measure"142 of the sort that often requires 
proof by clear-and-convincing evidence. 143 
Given this background, and reading the suspension and bar provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in pari materia with comparable statutes, a court could cer-
tainly hold that the Commission, in the context of a cease-and-desist proceeding, 
should refuse to enter a suspension or bar order unless the Commission can 
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood, indeed a strong likelihood, that the defen-
dant will continue to pose a risk to the public if permitted to serve as a corporate 
officer or director. Whether a court will do so remains to be seen. 
The Inherent Illegitimacy of a Lifetime Bar Order 
Congress has established what apparently was intended to be a modest thresh-
old, simple "unfitness," as the standard for the entry of a lifetime bar order. As 
the Patel court recognized, however, lifetime bar orders are qualitatively different 
from finite-term suspension orders, whether they are entered by a federal district 
judge in a litigated proceeding, or by the Commission in a cease-and-desist pro-
ceeding. Lifetime bar orders are punitive in nature, 144 inherently overbroad in 
139. 18 u.s. c. § 3583(d)(2) (2000). 
140. S. REP. No 98-473, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3183, 3279. 
141. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. at 872. 
142. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975,992-93 (5th Cir. 1977) (declining to affirm the district 
court's imposition of a lifetime bar even though it does affirm the forfeiture of the defendant's union 
office), vacated, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979). 
143. See, e.g., Crowe v. Smith, 261 F. 3d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 2001)(holding that in lawyer suspension 
and disbarment cases, the state must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence); Ferris v. 
Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292, 294 (Fla. 1987) (requiring that evidence of need to revoke a teacher's 
license be clear and convincing). For a time, the federal courts required that the SEC prove its case 
against regulated professionals by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 
676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 824-25 (D.C. Cir. 1977). That 
position was rejected by the Court in Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1981) (holding that 
the substantive case against a regulated professional (e.g., a claim that the defendant violated Rule 
lOb-S) need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence). At least one court has suggested 
that the SEC should still be held to a clear-and-convincing standard of proof where the remedy sought 
"would, in fact, deprive the defendants the ability to continue to pursue his livelihood." SEC v. Moran, 
922 F. Supp. 867, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
144. See Proffitt v. FDIC, 200 F. 3d 855, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that a lifetime bar of a banker 
has a "punitive purpose"); johnson v. SEC, 87 F. 3d 484, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that even a six-
month suspension imposes a "punishment"). 
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both scope and duration, 1" 5 and difficult to justify in terms of what we actually 
know about white collar recidivism. 146 They are, in the civil context, "the most 
serious punishment available."147 
It is nonetheless obvious that the Commission is enamored with the lifetime 
bar order and has recently increased its demands for this sanction. 148 It is, there-
fore, fair to stop and contemplate whether a lifetime bar order is appropriate 
in a civil proceeding when a comparable order is not available in a criminal 
proceeding! 
Consider this: convicted criminals are often subjected to occupational restric-
tions during a period of probation or supervised release . 149 The idea behind these 
occupational restrictions is that keeping the offender away from the type of en-
vironment in which he committed his crime can simultaneously accommodate 
both maximum autonomy for the unincarcerated defendant and maximum public 
protection. 
Significantly, however, occupational restrictions in criminal cases are extremely 
limited: 
145. See Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989: Disenfranchising Shareholders 
in Order to Protect Them, supra note 11, at 65-67. 
146. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal justice, 
114 HARV. L REv. 1429, 1450 (2001) ("A scientist's ability to predict future criminality using all 
available data is poor; using just the proxy of prior criminal history, a scientist's prediction is even 
less accurate ."); DAVID WEISBURD ET AL, WHITE-COLlAR CRIME AND CRIMINAL CAREERS 135 (2001) 
("It is difficult to predict future criminality on the basis of knowledge of the offenderl 'ls past social 
and criminal conduct and circumstances."). 
147. McNabb v. SEC, 298 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fisher,].. dissenting) . 
148. In fiscal year 2002, for example, the Commission sought court orders seeking to bar 126 
defendants from serving as an officer or director of a public company, "more than triple the number 
sought two years earlier." Andrew Countryman , Amid Budget Battle, SEC Chief Notes Soaring Activity, 
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 24, 2002 , at Bl. 
149. See, e.g., United States v. Jost, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17109, at *2 (lOth Cir. July 31, 2001) 
(upholding an order prohibiting the defendant from engaging in any sales-related employment, any 
employment which required him to invest money for others, or any employment which required him 
to render investment advice); United States v. Goodman, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 27293, at *3 (lOth 
Cir. Oct. 30, 2000) (upholding an order prohibiting the defendant from being self-employed, or 
operating as an independent contractor, officer, partner, or manager in any business or business entity 
without prior approval from his probation officer; also providing that he may not have access to or 
control over third-party financial information, accounts or transactions or be employed by a telemar-
keting venture); United States v. Szenay, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13656, at *ll (6th Cir. june 15, 1999) 
(upholding an order prohibiting the defendant from starting or owning his own business); United 
States v. Morris, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4194, at *2 (lOth Cir. Mar. 16, 1999) (upholding an order 
prohibiting the defendant from engaging in any type of employment which involves the processing 
of credit applications, or the solicitation of investors or lenders); United States v. Choate, 101 F.3d 
562 , 566 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding an order prohibiting the defendant from self-employment during 
his term of supervised release), reh'g denied, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1240 (8th Cir. jan. 24, 1997); 
United States v. Berridge, 74 F.3d 113, 114 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding an order prohibiting the 
defendant from obtaining employment in the banking industry); United States v. Manogg, 1995 U.S. 
App. LEX\$ 10899, at *3 (6th Cir. May 11 , 1995) (upholding an order prohibiting the defendant 
from participating in or becoming a party to any real estate transaction or affiliated with any business 
entity at an executive or administrative level); United States v. Mills, 959 F.2d 516, 517 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(upholding an order prohibiting the defendant from working in the car sales business), reh'g denied , 
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 13939 (5th Cir. June 2, 1992); United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 146 (5th 
Cir. 1979) (upholding an order prohibiting the defendant-a former Member of Congress-from running 
for office or engaging in political activity). 
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[Such restrictions are permitted] "only if [the court] determines that: (l) a 
reasonably direct relationship existed between the defendant's occupation 
.. . and the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction; and (2) imposition 
of such a restriction is reasonably necessary to protect the public because 
there is reason to believe that, absent such restriction, the defendant will 
continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which the defen-
dant was convicted."150 
Congress has further ordered that occupational restrictions on convicted criminals 
should "involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary" 
to promote criminal deterrence, protection of the public, and effective correctional 
treatment .151 This means that occupational restrictions may only be imposed "for 
the minimum time and to the minimum extent necessary to protect the public." 151 
Furthermore, occupational restrictions must be "especially fine-tuned" so as not 
to impinge on the defendant's lawful behavior.153 
More importantly for purposes of thinking about lifetime bar orders in civil 
cases, and especially in cease-and-desist proceedings, occupational restrictions in 
criminal cases expire no later than the date upon which the maximum sentence for the 
crime would have expired. In other words, if a sentence of incarceration could have 
run for a maximum of five years, the defendant's occupational restriction expires 
at the end of five years . There is no mechanism in criminal cases to impose any 
kind of lifetime occupational bar order. Thus, a defendant can be ordered not to 
engage in the used car business during the period of his supervised release, but 
he cannot be ordered to close or sell his dealership; 154 a defendant can be ordered 
not to practiCe pharmacy during his period of probation but he cannot be ordered 
to surrender his pharmacy license. 155 It is entirely reasonable to prohibit a lawyer 
from practicing law during his period of probation, so long as he is not ordered 
to surrender his license or required to resign from the bar. 156 In each case, the 
idea is that the offender, having served out his term of probation or supervised 
release, should be free to enter the occupational marketplace without limitations 
other than those the market itself imposes. 
Even where Congress has imposed an automatic occupational disqualification 
upon conviction of certain crimes (and note, Congress has not done so in the case 
of securities law violations), it has often recognized that significant intrusions into 
a defendant's ability to seek meaningful work should be time-limited. 157 
150. United States v. Peterson, 248 E3d 79 , 83 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES§ 5Fl.5); see also United States v. Doe, 79 E3d 1309, 1319 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[W]e 'carefully 
scrutinize unusual and severe conditions, such as one requiring the defendant to give up a lawful 
livelihood."') (quoting United States v. Cutler, 58 E3d 825, 838 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
151. 18 u.s.c. § 3583(d) (2000). 
152. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES§ 5Fl.5(b). 
153. United States v. Scott, 270 E3d 632, 635 (8th Cir. 2001). 
154. United States v. Mills, 959 E2d 516, 519-20 (5th Cir. 1992). 
155. United States v. Sterber, 846 E2d 842 , 843-44 (2d Cir 1988). 
156. United States v. Cutler, 58 E3d 825 , 838 (2d Cir. 1995). 
157. See 29 U.S. C. § 504(a)(5) (2000) (establishing that the conviction for robbery, bribery, extor-
tion , embezzlement, grand larceny, burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, or violent crimes bars 
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These inconsistencies, though probably not of constitutional proportions, do 
make one wonder about the necessity for a lifetime bar order except in the most 
extreme cases, or cases involving documented recidivism. 158 There is certainly 
reason to wonder whether a lifetime bar order can possibly be appropriate in the 
context of a cease-and-desist proceeding, which was designed to deal with those 
inconsequential infractions unworthy of a litigated proceeding. 159 Yet, that appar-
ently is what Congress has authorized. As of now, here is the playing field on 
which the Commission will most likely be operating, with predictable results: 
Securing a Suspension or Lifetime Bar Order Against a Securities Law Violator 
. Criminal Prost:cution Civil Enrorcement Action Ccase·and·Dtsist Proceeding 
What Must Be Proved' Guilt beyond a reasonable Liability by a preponderance liability by a preponderance 
doubt; a "willful" violation of the evidence; unfitness orthe evidence . unfitness 
by clear and convincing by a preponderance of the 
evidence evidence 
The Standard for Imposing a .. there is reason to believe "a reasonable likelihood of "some risk" of 
Temporary Disability that , absem such restriction, future misconduct" future misconduct 
("Suspension") the defendant will continue to 
engage in unlawful conduct 
similar to that for which the 
defendant was convicted;" the 
disability must be narrowly 
drawn 
The Standard for Imposing a Not permitted "a reasonable likelihood of "some risk" of future 
Pe nnanent Bar future misconduct" misconduct 
the offender from serving as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board, business 
manager, or representative of any labor organization for at least three but no more than thirteen years); 
id. § 1111(a)(3) (2000) (establishing that the conviction for robbery, bribery, extonion, embezzlement, 
grand larceny, burglary, arson , violation of narcotics laws, or violent crimes bars the offender from 
serving as an officer, director, trustee, custodian, counsel , agent, employee or representative in any 
capacity of an employee benefit plan for at least three but no more than thirteen years); 33 U.S. C.§ 569f 
(2000) (establishing that the conviction for intentionally affixing a label bearing "Made in America" 
inscription to a product that is not made in the United States and is used in a civil works project 
requires debarment for at least three but no more than five years) . 
158. Another area for possible exploration is the inconsistency in the sanctions imposed on regu-
lated professionals when compared to the sanctions imposed on non-regulated individuals. Often, 
regulated professionals are sanctioned by the Commission for finite-and brief-periods, rather than 
barred for life, even when their misconduct has been "egregious" or even criminal. See, e.g., In re Wu, 
Exchange Act Release No. 45694, 2002 SEC LEXlS 843, at *26-*27 (Apr. 4, 2002) (barring the 
defendant from association with a broker or dealer, but providing that he can reapply for association 
after two years, even though the defendant's conduct was "reckless and egregious"); In reQuest Capital 
Strategies, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 44935 , 2001 SEC LEXIS 2147, at *29 (Oct. 15, 2001) 
(barring the defendant from association with a broker or dealer, but providing that he can reapply 
after one year, even though the defendant's supervisory failures were "egregious," and reflected "ab-
dication of supervisory responsibility"); In re Rosenthal, Exchange Act Release 40387 , 1998 SEC LEXIS 
1850, at *10 (Sept. 1, 1998) (barring the defendant from association from a broker or dealer, but 
providing that he can reapply after three years, even though the defendant's conduct - for which he 
was convicted in a criminal prosecution- involved attempting to bribe a pension fund manager). 
Commentators have also noted that many barred professionals effectively are able to continue 
working in the financial services industry even after being suspended or barred, merely by switching 
from one segment of the industry to another, for example, by working [or an investment adviser rather 
than for a brokerage firm. See Heather Timmons &: Mike McNamee, Banned for Life (Sort of), Bus. 
WK., Mar. 3, 2003, at 112. 
159. See supra notes 6 7-99 and accompanying text. 
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The Lack of a Meaningful Safety Valve 
At least in theory, a permanent bar order "is not necessarily an irrevocable 
sanction; upon application, the Commission, if it finds that the public interest no 
longer requires the applicant's exclusion from the securities business, may permit 
his return-usually subject to appropriate safeguards." 160 This rule, applicable in 
cases of regulated professionals, should apply equally in cases of unregulated 
individuals. Had Congress acted consistently with its prior practice, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act would have contained some statutory guidelines for the lifting of life-
time bar orders. For example, Congress has directed that health care providers 
debarred from participating in the Medicare program may apply for reinstatement 
after the passage of three years, if they can provide "reasonable assurances that 
the types of actions which formed the basis for the original debarment have not 
recurred and will not recur." 161 Labor union officials debarred from holding a 
union office following a criminal conviction may apply for reinstatement after the 
passage of three years by showing that the reinstatement "would not be contrary 
to the purposes of [the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure] Act."162 
Banking officials debarred from involvement with insured depository institutions 
following a criminal conviction may apply for reinstatement at any time by show-
ing that lifting the bar would be "in the interest of justice."163 
At a minimum, the Commission should now articulate procedures and stan-
dards for seeking relief from lifetime bar orders, as it has done in connection with 
professionals barred from practicing before the Commission164 and regulated pro-
fessionals barred from associating with regulated firms. 165 Among other provi-
sions, those procedures and standards should include an opportunity to seek relief 
from a lifetime bar after no more than eight years, the opportunity to present 
witnesses and build a complete record of the defendant's rehabilitation, and the 
possibility of some form of peer review or peer supervision, both before and after 
the lifting of the bar. 166 
CONCLUSION 
As many have noted, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a hasty piece of work. Haste 
is especially evident in the provisions governing the power to suspend or bar 
160. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F2d 589,598 (2d Cir. 1969). 
161. 5 U.S.C. § 8902a(g)(4) (2000). 
162. 29 U.S.C. § 504(a)(5) (2000). 
163. 12 U.S.C. § 1829(a)(2)(B) (2000). 
164. SEC Rules of Practice, R. 102(e)(5), 17 C. FR. § 20l.l02(e)(5) (2003) (governing petitions for 
reinstatement of accountants or lawyers). 
165. SEC Rules of Practice, R. 193, 17 C. FR.§ 201.193 (2003) (governing applications by barred 
individuals for consent to associate with brokers, dealers, municipal securities dealers, government 
securities brokers, government securities dealers, investment advisers, investment companies or trans-
fer agents). 
166. The experiences of reinstated lawyers and doctors might provide guidance in the formulation 
of standards that would govern the process of lifting the bar. See Kimberly A. Lacey, Second Chances: 
The Procedure, Principles, and Problems With Reinstatement of Attorneys After Disbarment, 14 GEO. ]. 
lEGAL ETHICS 1117 (200 1 ). 
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securities law violators. We know that "unfitness" is now the standard upon which 
courts and the Commission may decide whether to enter a suspension or bar 
order. We do not know with any certainty, however, (i) what "unfitness" means; 
(ii) what distinguishes between unfitness sufficient to support a finite-term sus-
pension order and the kind of unfitness necessary to support a lifetime bar order; 
(iii) what standard-"reasonable likelihood of future misconduct" or some lesser 
standard-will be required to support a suspension or bar order in the federal 
district courts; (iv) what standard-"some risk" of future misconduct or some 
higher standard-will be required to support a suspension or bar order in an SEC 
cease-and-desist proceeding; (v) how and under what circumstances defendants 
subject to a lifetime bar order may be eligible for a lifting of the bar; and (vi) what 
the in terrorem impact of the suspension and bar provisions will be on corporate 
executives. 
Certainly, it is understood that "the new language will yield more aggressive 
use of the D&O bar sanction by the SEC and harsher results for individuals."167 
It is also anticipated that the SEC's position in settlement discussions will be 
strengthened. These advantages may be lost, however, if the Commission itself 
does not use its new powers in a reasonable way, either through judicious practice 
or, better yet, the enactment of reasonable rules and regulations which will provide 
the clarifications that Congress, in its haste, omitted. 
167. Alan Cohen & Michael Dunn, White Collar Crime-Maximum Security, THE LAWYER, Sept. 16, 
2002, at 29. 
